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Chapter 2

Kurdish Public Opinion in Turkey
Cultural and Political Demands
of the “Kurdish Street”
Ekrem Karakoç and H. Ege Özen

What do Kurds want? As the conflict has continued to persist for more than
three decades, both the Turkish state and Kurdish political movements claim
to represent the interests of Kurds, particularly cultural and political demands
of Kurds in Turkey. Despite the long life of this conflict, and the claims
of political actors from both sides, we still do not know how the interests
and demands of ordinary Kurds align with specific political actors or, more
importantly, with the Turkish government. The competing claims to represent
ordinary Kurds cause the major actors in the conflict, whether prostate or
pro-Kurdish, to reinforce their positions and intensify the conflict, resulting
in greater suffering for the very people they claim to speak.
However, these claims of representation are not empirically verified, and
the risk of self-serving bias and distortion is obviously great. The major political parties, including the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi, AKP), People’s Democratic Party (Halkın Demokratik Partisi, HDP),
or Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), all claim
to understand Kurds’ needs and be most responsive to and representative of
their cultural and political preferences. Unfortunately, neither scholarship nor
the media provide much empirical evidence for Kurds’ demands. Does the
AKP government’s offer of optional Kurdish language courses in schools—
the most they have managed to secure yet—satisfy Kurds? Or do Kurds have
further demands, both political and cultural? What about their views toward
the PKK or legal Kurdish parties? Do all Kurds agree with the government’s
description of the PKK as a “terrorist” organization, and how many see it as
a resistance organization fighting for independence?
This chapter investigates these questions by analyzing nationally representative public opinion survey in Turkey. This survey captures cultural and
21
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political demands of Kurds in 2011 and in 2015, respectively, before and
after peace negotiations begun between the AKP government and the Kurdish
political movement. First, we trace the trajectory of the state policies toward
the Kurdish conflict, followed by an examination of proposals, by both the
state and Kurdish movements, to “solve” the problem. Then we use an original public opinion data to test the extent to which ordinary Kurds share the
views of the main political actors. These surveys conducted before and after
the peace talks will help us to capture the change in attitudes between these
two different political contexts regarding the Kurdish conflict. While presenting what the Kurdish street wants, we will limit the number of issues to the
perception of interethnic equality in the cultural and political sphere as well
as attitudes toward Kurdish parties such as the HDP and the PKK.
Our analysis suggests that while Turkish governments have relatively
recently implemented reforms to expand Kurdish rights, these have remained
limited, and still does not recognize Kurdish identity as a collective cultural and political identity. However, the Kurdish ethnic identity has grown
increasingly important to many Kurds as a result of the politicization of their
identity during the three-decades-long civil war.1 Our findings confirm this
assessment: The majority of Kurds want education in their mother tongue,
to listen to sermons in Kurdish, to restore villages and town to their Kurdish
names, and want to be served in Kurdish in hospitals, courts, and other public
institutions. As to their political demands, half of the Kurds polled demanded
a regional parliament and flag, the establishment of Kurdish as an official
language, and political autonomy. Political developments between 2011 and
2015, including the peace talks, the Roboski Massacre on December 28,
2011, the siege of Kobani in October 2014, and the AKP’s indifferent reactions to these events have further complicated an already fraught situation.
They have served both to increase support for cultural and political autonomy
and secession, and to empower Kurdish parties that have gained the reputation as the true representatives of the Kurdish street a few months before the
peace process officially ended in the aftermath of the June 7, 2015 elections.
FRAMING KURDS AND KURDISH CONFLICT
To understand and analyze public opinion on salient social, economic, and
political issues, we need to investigate how elites across the political spectrum construct a political discourse and function as society’s gatekeepers,
using media and educational institutions as intermediary agents. Political
behavior literature suggests that ordinary people turn to the elites for their
cues in forming their opinions on political issues, whether these elites are
party leaders, labor unions, the Church, or others.2 In other words, one’s
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ideological stance, as well as ethnic and religious identity, affects which elites
they will turn to and process information or cues while the elites compete
to shape public opinion to their own purposes. In this regard, the Kurdish
conflict in Turkey is typical rather than exceptional and illustrates how social
and political elites shape public opinion on the Kurdish conflict, and to what
extent the Kurdish street is receptive or resistant to the competing discourses
and policies of elites, particularly Kemalist elites.
The next section discusses how the state and mainstream political parties
approach and frame the Kurdish problem, with a particular focus on the post1984 era. It investigates their discourses and policies the Turkish mainstream
media dutifully propagated. Then, it turns to the Kurdish political movement
that offers an alternative discourse, pointing to political and economic discrimination of Kurds, and demanding political and economic equality.
FROM BROKEN PROMISES TO DENIAL
Even though there are different phases of the Kurdish conflict, the state’s
responses to the Kurdish problem between 1923 and the early 1990s can be
identified as the denial of the Kurds and Kurdish “problem.” It is true that
the Kurdish problem did not start with the formation of the nation-state, but
goes back to the centralization policies under the Ottoman Empire; however,
for the sake of space, this article will focus on the post-1923 era.3 The denial
policies in this era have dominated the political discourses of both Turkish
actors and institutions. The causes of this denial lie, to a certain extent, in
the (inherent) colonial/hierarchical mindset of Turkish elites, derived from
the institutionalized belief that to catch up to the civilized world, a modern
nation-state must be created around a secular Sunni Turkish identity. The
ruling elites of the new republic, mostly former generals or bureaucrats
originally from the Western provinces of the Ottoman Empire, had shared
the belief that adopting political reforms for (religious) minorities or giving
political autonomy to them in the nineteenth century had not stopped the
disintegration of the empire. Disturbed by this experience, despite the founding elites of the republic promised and even played with the idea of local
autonomy for Kurds during the independence war, the Turkish political elites
discounted any political reform that would have granted cultural or political
autonomy to Kurds. Rather, they formulated policies that viewed Kurdish
ethnicity as an existential threat to be either assimilated or repressed.4
To assimilate a Kurdish population largely residing in the southern part
of the country into the new Turkish national identity in the early 1920s, the
state banned the Kurdish language in public spaces and replaced street, village, and town names with Turkish ones.5 Parents could not give Kurdish
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names to their newborn children, and in the eastern and southeastern region
of Anatolia, Kurdish schools (mostly religious schools called medrese) were
closed.6 Turks received preferential treatment in hiring at public institutions
in Kurdish-dominated cities, and many Kurdish-speaking officials critical of
the state’s repressive policies were either fired or sent to the western part of
Turkey.7 Starting with the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, and especially after
the 1934 Settlement Act, Law Number 2510, Kurdish elites and tens of thousands of ordinary Kurds were forcibly displaced and resettled in the Western cities of Turkey, while migrants from the Caucasus and other regions
replaced them in selected provinces.8 This resettlement policy was phased
out after 1950, but its backbone, the rejection of Kurds and their language,
remained in effect until the 1990s.
The official discourse and popularized public perception in Turkey were
that Kurds are not a distinct ethnic group; these Easterners (Doğulular) are
“mountain Turks,” who had lost the linguistic and cultural similarity with the
rest of the population, and they needed the modernizing hand of the state. The
state’s modernization polices aimed to re-acculturate this population so that
it could catch up with the western cities of the country, and the country as a
whole could in turn catch up with the civilized western world.9 The inferiority
complex toward the West is matched by a superiority complex toward Kurds,
along with the right to control and assimilate this less-developed people
into Turkish society and culture. In this framework, the conflict becomes a
struggle between a modernized state and the culturally backward periphery.
Intellectuals, academics, and political elites can thus easily justify downplaying Kurds and assimilationist policies, preferring to focus on the political
cleavage, the split between secularism and religion, and the debate between
socialism and capitalism/imperialism. With the exception of some socialist
movements that incorporated the Kurds into their discourse of class struggle
and anti-imperialism, most parties, movements, and major political figures
were silent about the Turkish state’s denial of an ethnic group’s existence and
the ban on Kurdish language, music, and culture.
In an attempt to refute the accusation that the state’s policies were assimilationist, Heper (2007) claimed that the Turkish state neither denied nor assimilated Kurds, only mistreating them in times of exceptional “trouble.”10 Under
normal circumstances, according to the official line as defended by Heper,
state policies were geared toward re-acculturating Kurds into Turkish society.
In that way, both Kurds and Kurdified Turks could be reconciled to the rest
of Turkish society, thereby preserving the integrity and unitary nature of the
state. Heper conveniently overlooks practices like “skull measuring anthropological attempts to identity ‘real Turks’” and the creation of a new Turkish
history and theory of language centered around ethnic Turks.11 Nor does he
discuss the thousands of people who died in the name of re-acculturation or
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the inequality and discrimination in public employment and the social sphere.
He asserted that such policies were products of times of particular “trouble,”
and assumed that the state was otherwise impartial. To the contrary to Heper
(2007)’s claim, as Tezcür and Gürses (2017) empirically show, these discriminatory policies have not gone away in recent decades, but rather have
continued to imprint interethnic inequality in the country’s political system.12
The denial of Kurds persisted long after the suppression of the last major
rebellions against the state in the late 1930s. As Turkey developed a multiparty political system, Kurdish elites found themselves forced to navigate
conventional party politics, running as candidates for mayors or parliaments
in the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), Justice Party (Adalet Partisi,
AP), New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP), center-left Republican
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), socialist Workers’ Party
of Turkey (TIP), and Güven Party, as well as independent candidates in
the 1950s and 1960s. The relatively free atmosphere of the 1960s provided
opportunities for Kurdish nationalists to form their own left-leaning organizations and demand solutions to the socioeconomic problems of the East and
the discriminatory policies of the state. Disinterested Turkish leftist groups
and organizations viewed the Kurdish problem as a by-product of class conflict and imperialism, gradually alienating Kurdish activists and leading them
to form their own Kurdish organizations (e.g., Eastern Meetings) starting
with the late 1960s.13
The repressive political atmosphere of the 1970s led some socialist movements that included Kurdish youth and students to believe that taking arms
against this authoritarian state was the only option, while others remained
committed to working inside the system to transform it. Beginning in 1978,
martial law was declared in several Kurdish provinces, and in that same year,
Turkey’s rejectionist and assimilationist policies sparked the formal establishment of the PKK, a Marxist/Leninist group of Kurdish students active in
the leftist and Kurdish student movements, headed by Abdullah Öcalan.14 As
most of the Kurdish political movements came to existence throughout the
1960s and 1970s, the PKK built its resistance on anti-colonialism, and the
ultimate objective of the movement was to form a single (united) independent
state called “Kurdistan.”15 A secondary objective was a “reunification” or
“reestablishment” of the left.16 Although the PKK engaged in armed struggles
against Turkish security forces and prostate Kurdish landlords, its future was
not certain as it initially had little popular support among Kurds in the region.
As Bozarslan (2001) argued, however, the military coup of 1980 facilitated
the popular acceptance of the PKK’s political discourse after the new government banned Kurdish language and music in public spaces, changed the
Kurdish names of villages and towns, and implemented other repressive
policies, especially against Kurdish political elites.17 The PKK’s first major
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deadly attack came only months after the military transferred power to civilians on August 15, 1984, and Kurds, especially those in southeastern Turkey,
saw the strikes against the security forces as a legitimate response to the
state’s repressive and assimilationist attitudes toward them.18
RECOGNITION WITH A STICK
The denial policy finally ended in 1991 when the government sent the bill
to remove the ban speaking “languages other than Turkish.” The change in
the denial policy was the result of the intense fight between the PKK and the
security apparatus and the then-president Turgut Özal’s realization that this
problem could not be solved only through the military means. The PKK had
posed itself as a formidable actor against exploitative landlords and the military over time, proving itself as an effective movement from the relatively
easily crushed Kurdish rebellion in the 1920s and 1930s. Özal and some civilian elites were aware of a growing threat to the integrity and economic development of the state. For example, a former state minister, Adnan Kahveci had
presented a secret report to Özal that it was the Kurdish issue, rather than any
economic or other political issue, that posed the greatest problem for the state.
Suleyman Demirel, the then prime minister, spelled the possibility of a constitutional citizenship in 1992, and Tansu Çiller, replacing Demirel as prime
minister in 1993, briefly suggested the Basque model as a possible solution.19
Özal contemplated different ideas to end the conflict, including an amnesty
to the PKK. However, these ideas were rebuffed by the Kemalist military and
bureaucracy, the guardians of the traditional Kemalist regime. Rejecting any
sort of accommodation or compromise paved the way for the return of the
securitization policies that emphasized a military means to ending the PKK
and the Kurdish problem as a whole. The hope of finding a peaceful solution
finally ended with the death of Özal in 1993. While recognizing “the Kurdish reality” and Kurdish identity in 1991, the Turkish state had moved from
the denial to recognition with a stick, and Kurdish problem is now defined as
“separatism/terrorism.”
The political discourse of social, political, and economic elites as well as
the Turkish public followed the footsteps of the Turkish military and state
institutions over time. In this telling, the Kurdish conflict does not emanate
from the denial policies that condoned and even justified repression and
human rights violation, but rather from violence/terrorism, supported by
foreign powers that have sought Turkey’s division since the Sevres Treaty
of 1920. Stated simply for the public’s benefit, the state is again under siege
by imperialist powers, and the PKK is a terrorist organization used by those
powers to recruit and brainwash the poor and ignorant or to kidnap children
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from their families. As a transitional public discourse from the denial to the
unwilling recognition is the claim that the PKK has nothing to do with the
Kurds; that in reality, its leader Abdullah Öcalan is of Armenian (read: evils)
AQ: Please
origins, as are most of his militants.20
provide missThis narrative regarding the PKK was gradually replaced by various ing volume
combinations of discourses of terror, foreign powers, and underdevelop- for note ref.
ment in subsequent years: Kurds or Easterners are poor and ignorant, easily Özden Melis
Uluğ and J
deceivable by the “terrorist” organizations and foreign powers.21 Mainstream Christopher
Turkish media, pro-government or not, have popularized the state narrative Cohrs, 2017
and worked to discredit the Kurdish political movement. Prior to the 1990s,
newspapers rarely used phrases like “Kurds” or “Kurdish” in news reports
or columns. In the 1990s, newspapers began using those terms, implicitly
acknowledging the reality of the Kurdish situation and a Kurdish ethnicity
while still aligning with the state discourse. For example, although the media
began discussing the Kurdish language, they did so in a pejorative sense that
portrayed it as a primitive language cobbled together from Arabic, Persian,
and Turkish. The papers in question even cited public opinion surveys as evidence that Kurds were primarily concerned about employment opportunities
and were relatively unconcerned about learning or speaking Kurdish.22 The
condescending attitude toward Kurdish becomes evident when the newspapers used terms like “so-called Kurds” or claimed that Kurdish language was
too primitive to permit sophisticated forms of literature, culture, or politics.
As the government, military, and media promoted the official position,
neither the left-wing nor right-wing parties provided a substantive challenge
to the accepted narrative, with some limited exceptions. The Kemalist left
and its parties, Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkcı Parti,
SHP/CHP, did not offer policies or solutions to the Kurdish conflict that
differed from the state’s. For them, the problem was socioeconomic; therefore, the solutions remained limited to the eradication of poverty, ignorance,
underdevelopment, feudalism and so on.23 Neither the center-right AP, nor its
successor parties went beyond these explanations. When the SHP formed a
coalition with the Kurdish party, the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik
Toplum Partisi, DTP), Çiller’s the Basque model proposal for the Kurdish
problem, or Mesut Yılmaz, former leader of Motherland party after Özal,
suggested recognizing Kurdish as an official language and offering optional
language courses and private Kurdish channels, but they were all quickly
rebuked by the military.24 Nevertheless, these attempts signaled changes in
the state’s policies in the post-1999 era, when the capture of Öcalan and the
European Union (EU) negotiations paved the way for new policies amidst the
economic crisis.25
As for the socialist movements, their relationship with the Kurdish movement was more constructive, but their popular base was small and they sought
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solutions under the socialist system that they would eventually establish. Like
proponents of the idea that “Islam is the solution,” the socialist groups kept the
pillar of their faith and asserted that “socialism is the solution” and that social
class as an identity supersedes all others, including ethnicity, in the struggle
against the bourgeoisie/imperialism. Dissatisfied with the socialist movements,
Kurdish elites gradually divorced from them beginning in the late 1960s.
The Turkish left’s position on the Kurdish conflict should be explored both
in international and domestic contexts. The left in Turkey has always been
deeply fragmented, not unlike leftist movements elsewhere, such as France.
Global contexts (e.g., student movements in the West, the growth of U.S.
power) as well as local (the 1960 coup and the relatively liberal 1961 Constitution) paved the way for various leftist movements to appear in Turkey.
Almost all of these movements began with a critique of U.S. imperialism. The
decade under the governance of the DP was seen as a rupture from the Kemalist revolutionary resistance against the Western imperialism, and therefore one
of the most common slogans of the 1970s was “Fully Independent Turkey!”
However, as Jongerden and Akkaya (2012) claim, the Turkish left was mostly
AQ: Please
26
provide miss- silent regarding Turkey’s status as a colonizing country in the Southeast.
The military coups of both 1971 and 1980 were highly influential in shaping volume
for note ref. ing the relationship between Kurds and the mainstream left or social democrat
26
parties. After 1971, the CHP had a great opportunity to convert the high dynamism among far-left groups into a large voter base for itself because there
was a high degree of repression on the leftist revolutionary organizations. To
use this opportunity, the CHP took some effective steps in 1973 and 1974
regarding political pluralism, and this gained them many supporters especially
among Kurds and Alevi citizens. In addition, starting in the mid-1970s, the
volume of political violence reached such a height that the people on both
sides, Turks and Kurds, began to fear a possible civil war. Therefore, the CHP
was seen as the only option to stop the political violence. And as a matter of
fact, the 1970s were significant because of the electoral success of the CHP
in Kurdistan, thanks to its advocacy of democracy in Turkey. According to
Bozarslan (2012), the breaking point was the late 1970s when Mehdi Zana
AQ: Please
27
provide miss- and several Kurdish figures were elected mayors in Kurdish majority cities.
After the military intervention of 1980, all of the preexisting political
ing volume
for note ref. parties were eliminated, and therefore the relationship between the Kurdish
27
movement and the mainstream left ended. However, a new social democrat
party was established in 1985. The SHP can be considered a continuation
of the Kemalist CHP and yet managed to become the second largest party
in the Turkish Parliament after the 1987 elections. The electoral success
included several Kurdish representatives, and it was taken as a sign of greater
openness to recognizing the claims of Kurdistan. However, this symbiotic
relationship came to a halt after some of the Kurdish deputies participated
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in the international Kurdish conference in Paris in 1989, which led to their
expulsion from the party. Nineteen more deputies resigned from the party in
protest, and laid the groundwork for the establishment of the People’s Labor
Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP) in 1990, the first of eight such Kurdish
parties that have since been banned by the state. The alliance between the
representative actor of the Kurdish movement (HEP) and the mainstream
Turkish left (SHP) was given one last shot in the 1991 elections, after which
twenty-two deputies from HEP were returned to parliament. However, the
controversy regarding the swearing-in ceremony of Hatip Dicle and Leyla
Zana ended with the revocation of their parliamentary immunity and jail sentences in 1994 for their alleged membership in the PKK.28
Even though the SHP agreed to make room for Kurdish representation,
there was no further advocacy of pro-Kurdish ideas within the party accordAQ: Please
ing to Bozarslan (2012).29 Also, there was no explicit mention of Kurds or provide missKurdistan. The party platform’s reference to “Turkey-wide democratization” ing volume
was carefully formulated; in addition, the removal of Kurdish deputies from for note ref.
SHP following the Kurdish conference in Paris was critical because it meant 29
that Kurds could not integrate into the Turkish political elite class, leaving
them only the option of becoming autonomous of Turkish political class.30
Yeğen (2007) divides the relationship between the Turkish left and Kurdish movement into four periods between the early republican era and the
1990s.31 While he describes the 1970s as the period of “decay,” the 1990s are
the years of “rupture” between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish left.
For instance, one of the most prominent leftist parties of the 1990s, the Party
of Freedom and Solidarity (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP), spoke
about the need to solve the Kurdish problem but refrained from making it an
important element of the party’s platform.32 Leaving the task to Kurdish parties would eventually distance the party from Kurds and Kurds from leftist
Turks. Two other important parties representing the Turkish left in the 1990s,
the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) and the Labor Party (IP), failed even
more thoroughly to recognize the autonomous position of the Kurdish movement. For instance, for the TKP the Kurdish issue is simply an example of a
labor issue. This position is what Yeğen (2007) describes as dating “back to
the beginning of the socialist movements in modern Turkey’s history,” which
means that the party would support the Kurdish movement not in their efforts
of national and cultural rights and demands, but rather in their class struggle
against imperialism.33 The IP, under the leadership of Doğu Perinçek, completely changed its position toward the Kurdish movement, and in 2005, the
party declared that the Kurdish issue had been solved regarding democratic
rights that Kurds had been demanding.34 In the following years, the party
leadership went even further and adopted a racist and hostile discourse
toward Kurds and the Kurdish movement.
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On the other hand, the (Turkish) Islamist movements, including the Welfare Party (WP) and their successors have long been attributing the Kurdish
problem to secularism and the Kemalist ideology, believing that the secularist policies of “the past” had weakened the religious ties between Turks and
Kurds. They courted Kurds with a less nationalistic discourse electoral program. One the one hand, they recognized Kurds as a distinct group with its
language and culture in their programs and discourses, but at the same time
wanted to subordinate them to a supranational Islamic identity.35 By capturing
the state they tried to Islamize the society but failed to offer any substantive
changes to existing political institutions, which were the products of hardcore nation-state ideology. As a result, they neither wanted nor needed to
craft a meaningful proposal or policy to deal with the Kurdish question.
Ümit Cizre’s work on the Islamist actors in the Kurdish conflict shows how
the Islamists portrayed the conflict to their bases in the 1990s. The TurkishIslamists emphasized the distinctiveness of Kurds. They often highlighted
human rights violations in the region, but were careful not to offend the
sensibilities of the Kemalist state, emphasizing the integrity of the Turkish
state under one flag and motherland.36 The Kurdish Islamists have sought a
solution to the problem from claims of Islamic brotherhood and the formula
of “Ummah,” but noticed that Turkish Islamists do not share the practical
implications of being part of it, noting such glaring absences as constitutional
recognition of Kurds or the provision of Kurdish education. The first shock
to Kurdish Islamists came with the 1991 electoral coalition of the Welfare
Party (WP) with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which
wields significant power and influence among the state’s security apparatus.
This coalition showed the “nationalist reflex” of the Islamist WP, thereby
increasing skepticism toward Turkish Islamist parties among Kurds. The
party’s nationalistic discourse and practices belied their (disingenuous) usage
of Islamic brotherhood, resonated less among Kurds, and reduced the total
votes for the WP and its successor parties in the region in the subsequent
elections even though its national vote increased. However, the post February 28 developments in which the WP-led government was overthrown; the
Constitution Court banned the WP, and successor Virtue Party helped Kurds
to maintain the benefit of the doubt toward the (Turkish) Islamic movement
and its parties.
AKP ERA: HOPE AND HOPELESSNESS
The AKP era initially seemed to deserve the benefit of the doubt from
Kurds. The AKP leadership’s statements did not differ significantly from its
predecessor, the WP: They blamed the Kurdish problem on the repression
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and mistakes of the past secularist regime. The capture of Öcalan, the EU
Accession process, along with the abolishment of the death penalty and other
changes paved the way for the AKP to launch some reforms. This era has
also been an opportunity, especially for religious Kurds, to test the AKP’s
discourse of “Islamic brotherhood” between Turks and Kurds. Erdogan’s
message gave hope to Kurds, as he stated the Kurdish conflict was not the
cause but the consequences of the repressive policies of single-party era. To
the chagrin of the Kemalist establishment in the state apparatus, the AKP
governments have passed several reform bills in the parliament, but the
implementation of many programs was purposefully delayed or stagnated by
an unwilling security and bureaucratic state apparatus. Nevertheless, assisted
also by the bill passed several months before it came to power in 2002, the
AKP governments restored Kurdish names to Kurdish villages, private bodies
were allowed to teach Kurdish, broadcasting Kurdish in public and private
channels was permitted, as was the repatriation of some “internally displaced
Kurds to their original homes.”37
The AKP leader, Erdogan, saw secularism as a cause of division between
Turks and Kurds and “highlighted the value of unification and brotherhood
on the basis of ‘common citizenship’ in the Republic of Turkey.”38 Erdogan
played with the idea of Türkiyelilik, that is to say, belonging to the citizenship
of Turkey in the early years of the AKP rule, but his references have become
sporadic over time. Given the fact that neither CHP nor any other major
political actor offered anything beyond the AKP’s policy initiatives, there
was cautious optimism among supporters of the Kurdish political movement
that the AKP as an antiestablishment party was the one that could solve the
Kurdish problem despite its leaders’ contradictory or ambivalent statements.
The military suzerainty over the political sphere, the party closures, the Internet memorandum (e-muhtıra) of April 27, 2007 by the military—despite the
changing rhetoric of Erdogan regarding the Kurdish conflict—appealed to
Kurds. This helped the AKP win the majority of Kurdish votes in Kurdishmajority cities, even increasing its share of the vote in Diyarbakır from 16
percent in 2002 elections to 41 percent in 2007.
For the Kurdish political movement, despite some “positive” steps and dis- AQ: Please
course from the AKP, as a result of the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) check the
operations that started in April 2009, more than 8,000 people were impris- placement
the closoned, signaling the return to securitization policies of the Kurdish conflict.39 of
ing double
For the Kurdish movement, and later for Kurds outside of the movement, quotation
“the distinction between the ‘Kemalist state’ and the ‘AKP government’” has mark in the
become hazy, even for secular pro-Kurdish movements which had previously sentence ‘For
Kurdish
sympathized with the AKP. Furthermore, the AKP’s cyclic arrogance toward the
movement,
the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, its harsh response to Kurdish and later for
demands for democratic autonomy in Turkey, and its aggressiveness toward Kurds…’.
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the creation of a de facto Kurdish autonomy in Syria have revealed to traditionally religious Kurds just how limited its discourse on Islamic brotherhood
really is.
When it comes to the recognition of collective rights, such as having Kurdish education in public and private schools or the acceptance of Kurds in
the Constitution as a separate ethnic group, Erdogan was discreet or quietly
unwilling while the Kemalist vanguard organization, the military, was not.
As a reaction to the EU Commission president who urged Turkey to reform
cultural and political rights for Kurds, in 2008, the then chief of staff, İlker
Başbuğ, said the following: “Nobody can demand or expect Turkey to make
collective arrangements for a certain ethnic group in the political arena, outside of the cultural arena, that would endanger the nation-state structure as
well as the unitary state structure.”40
While this skepticism was increasing within the Kurdish political movement, there were still secret negotiations between the AKP governments and
the Kurdish movement. News of the Oslo Process, which consisted of secret
talks between the PKK and state officials, was leaked by the security apparatus associated with the Gülenist movement that wanted to resolve the Kurdish
problem through their own form of Islamic brotherhood. For this purpose, the
Gülenist movement actively engaged in opening schools, university preps
institutions, and houses for young Kurds.41 As they competed for Kurdish
membership, they not only received support from their members, but also
from nonmembers who saw them as a lesser evil than the PKK. The state has
also collaborated with major business organizations such as Turkish Industry
and Business Association (TÜSIAD) and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), as well as local and national NGOs, to
assert its assimilationist policies toward Kurds. These organizations actively
drafted programs or participated in “no child behind” policies, “required preschool initiatives” in order to “enable children in whose houses the spoken
language is Kurdish to speak Turkish well.”42
What about the Kurdish movement and the trajectory of their policies
toward the conflict? According to Güneş (2013), the PKK began its attempts
to adopt a political solution to the conflict in the 1990s, especially following Öcalan’s trial when the organization began to frame the solution to the
Kurdish question “on the basis of development and deepening of democracy
and the creation of decentralized and democratized political entities.”43 The
significant shift regarding the demands and goals of the PKK, from regional
autonomy or federalism toward democratic autonomy, was justified by the
fact that the Kurdish population in Turkey was geographically dispersed. In
2005, the PKK announced that the original objective of forming a Kurdish
nation-state had become an impediment on the route to freedom and the new
strategic goal was the establishment of “an interlinked network of councils
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as the basis of self-determination and a means of living together.”44 This
change in discourse does not mean that the PKK gave up on its claims to
self-determination; rather, it had developed a new understanding of a radical
democracy that will become possible only through the active involvement
of citizens.
The Kurdish movement also used religious discourse both to attract religious Kurds and to serve as a counter-move to the religious rhetoric of the
AKP. To counter both the government and Islamic movements, the predominantly secular elites of the Kurdish political movement continually softened
its secularist stance. This strategic change can also be found in its leaders’
writings. While Öcalan considered Islam reactionary and backward in the
1980s, his later writings assigned it a positive role to Islam, in particular, the
revolutionary character of Prophet against established order. Sarıgil (2018)
describes how in March of 2011 pro-PKK clerics refused to participate in Friday prayers in Turkish, and instead began offering public prayers in Kurdish
as a counterweight to the state-controlled mosques.45 The Democratic Islam
Congress and other affiliated religious bodies have also pursued policies to
appeal to religious Kurds. Several prominent political Islamists were also
nominated as members of Parliament (MPs), such as Şerafettin Elçi and Altan
Tan, and others were chosen as electoral candidates to become either mayor
or MPs of pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the elections
of 2011 and on.
Through negotiating with the Kurdish movement both openly and secretly,
the AKP resorted to the policies aimed to increase religiosity in the region.
Religious schools (Imam Hatips) and mosques have disproportionately
mushroomed in the region under the AKP when compared to the rest of the
country.46 The directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and their salaried
imams and the employment of “meles,” who are the graduates of informal
religious schools (madrasas) in the region, have been mobilized with the goal
of reducing the influence of the Kurdish movement. Also, the AKP governments have pursued the policies to strengthen rival Kurdish movements in
the region. These religious movements ranged from the Gülenist movement
to the various factions of Nur and Nakshibendi movements to the Islamist
Huda-Par and its predecessors. At the same time, these movements, through
normative and resource ties to the governments, expanded their sphere of
influences, increasing their activities and associations as well as through
media and radio. They have been a major rival to the Kurdish movement in its
efforts to increase its sphere of influence to the rest of Kurds in the region.47
After continuous disappointments with the government reform promises,
the Islamic movements’ approach and solutions have started to converge
with the Kurdish movement. While still seeing the Kurdish movement a
rival anti-religious movement, religious Kurdish movements have had to
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adapt their discourse in order to compete effectively in Kurdish cities.48
Over time, these movements have also increased their demand for the right
to have education in mother tongue, Friday sermons (hutbe) in Kurdish,
and Kurdish names for villages and towns. Besides, observing the growing
nationalist discourse of Turkish Islamists and their disinterest in the Kurdish problem has further reduced the credibility of the solutions based on
“Islamic brotherhood.” In contrast, as the findings below suggest, secular
and non-secular Kurds have started to converge regarding their linguistic
and cultural demands.
In sum, as the AKP was associated with the state, not a party that challenges the Kemalist state, its solutions became very similar to those of the
Kemalists, with some minor improvements. The AKP has viewed “the PKK
and underdevelopment as the diagnostic,” to solve the conflict it relies on
the socioeconomic development policies as well as bestowing some cultural
rights as individual rights. It offered to teach Kurdish as an optional course,
but not as a collective right that guaranteed an education in the Kurdish language, or that established Kurdish schools.49
THE KURDISH STREET AND CULTURAL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
During the peace talks, the AKP governments reached the limit of its willingness to compromise by offering to recognize the “folkloric identity”
of Kurds, that is to say, permitting optional Kurdish language, allowing
defendants speaking Kurdish to use translators (but paid by themselves)
in courts, opening Kurdish language departments in selected universities,
Kurdish TV channels, and so on.50 Erdogan was using ambiguous language,
regarding education in Kurdish, to court Kurds and not to increase resentment among Kurds until around the peace process was failing in 2015.51
Erdogan’s press talk, soon after he repudiated the Dolmabahçe talks is
revealing. Erdogan disclosed his opinions on “solving the Kurdish problem” when asked about education in Kurdish: “Did we put optional courses
in mother language within our education system? Done. What else do you
want? Do you suggest that it be required? How come something like this
happens? This country has one official language. (If you give this up), you
cannot stop other demands.”52
In contrast, the Kurdish movement has demanded the recognition of Kurds
in the Constitution, education in the Kurdish language, Kurdish names for
places, religious sermons in Kurdish, recognition of Kurdish as an official
language, a Kurdish parliament, and so on. Islamist Kurdish movements also
share similar positions on linguistic and cultural demands but differ in their
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political ones such as regional parliament, flag, and autonomy and secession.
While Turkish governments keep defining the PKK as a terrorist organization
even while negotiating in secrecy and the HDP as an organic extension of
PKK, the Kurdish public views them differently, as the election results and
public opinion surveys show.
Is there a convergence between Kurdish public opinion and political actors
concerning the issues discussed above? To determine this, we utilized two
nation-wide representative surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015.53 The survey
was conducted in Turkish and Kurdish (the latter in the Kurdish-populated
residential areas). Using a multistage, stratified, clustered random sampling,
these surveys reached approximately 6,900 and 7,100 adult participants
across Turkey in 2011 and 2015, respectively. Fourteen percent of the respondents in 2011 (901 persons) and 17 percent in 2015 (1,340 persons) identified themselves as Kurdish. The responses display the preference of only the
Kurdish respondents in this study.
To capture public opinion among Kurds, we first turn to table 2.1 to present the results of the public opinion survey about the extent to which Kurds
feel that they are equal citizens of the Turkish state. Table 2.1 suggests that
47 percent of Kurds in 2011 believe that the state discriminates against
Kurds. This rate rose to 57 percent in 2015. When the respondents were
asked whether civil rights and liberties in Turkey reflect equality between
Turks and Kurds, 65 percent of Kurds said no. The same percentage of Kurds
perceived interethnic socioeconomic inequality. When we imperfectly compare these results with Ergil’s findings, which are based on a public opinion
survey conducted in August 2008 in cities where Kurds make up a significant
percentage of the population, we see that the perception of discriminatory
behavior was also high.54 When people were asked in his survey whether they
agreed or disagreed with the statement that Kurds experience discrimination
in western cities, this perception of discrimination reached 51.2 percent in the
then DTP-dominated cities and 29 percent in the regional cities where DTP is
not dominant. Imperfect comparison of Ergil’s findings with this study, as the
sampling methodology and differences in the wordings of the survey questions, suggests that the perception of discrimination and interethnic inequality
has remained high among Kurds.
When the second survey was conducted in April 2015, the future of the
peace talks looked bleak, yet it was before the urban warfare started in
Diyarbakır’s historic Sur region and other Kurdish cities, and the Kurdish
opening officially ended in August 2015. Between 2013, when the peace was
officially celebrated and 2015, when the second survey was conducted, the
PKK and the HDP had both increased their popular support among Kurds. The
Roboski massacre and the Kobani siege had resulted in great disappointment
in the AKP, which was perceived as condoning of the killings of Kurds by the
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Perception of Interethnic Political and Economic Inequality
2011 (%)

AQ: Should
the word
‘Kurds’ in
the sentence
‘Do you
think that
Kurds and
Kurds…’ be
replaced by
‘Turks’ in
table 2.1?

State discrimination against Kurds
Inequality in civil rights and liberties
Inter-ethnic socioeconomic inequality
N

47
–
–
901

2015 (%)
57
65
65
1340

Note: The translations of the questions are as follows: Do you think that Kurds face discrimination from
the state? Do you think that Kurds and Kurds have the same civil rights and liberties?; Do you think that
there is socioeconomic equality between Turks and Kurds? The answers were either yes or no; and some
answers were recoded while making this table.
Source: The authors created this table using statistics from two original public opinion surveys conducted
in 2011 and 2015.

Turkish military and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) respectively.
The AKP’s policies and the political mobilization of the Kurdish movement
for the defense of Kobani siege also created sympathy toward the Kurdish
movement among the Kurds who had distanced themselves from the PKK. In
addition to the Roboski massacre and Kobani, one can argue that peace talks
legitimized the PKK in the eyes of skeptical and pragmatic Kurds that do not
want to be alienated from the Kurdish political movement for potential political and economic benefits in the aftermath of possible peace process and new
political configurations. If the state recognized the PKK, then people hailed
the PKK and the Kurdish movement as a powerful political organization of
the future. The increasing legitimation of the PKK has become obvious in
respondents’ answers to three questions. Table 2.2 shows that 30 percent in
2011, and 55 percent in 2015 stated that the PKK represents Kurds. Those
who did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization increased from 48
percent to 55 percent in 2015. Given the possibility that some Kurds may
view the PKK not a terrorist organization, but do not see it as an organization
representing Kurds, we operationalize another variable: popular support for
Table 2.2 Kurdish Street and PKK
2011 (%)
PKK represents Kurds
PKK is not a terror organization
PKK as a legal political party
N

30
48
63*
901

2015 (%)
55
55
85/57*
1340

Note: The translations of the questions are as follows: Do you think that the PKK represent Kurds; is the PKK
a terrorist organization? The question for the PKK as a legal party was asked differently in these surveys.
The 2011 survey asks “PKK should disarm itself and participate in politics” while the 2015 survey divides
the question of the earlier survey and asks as two separate questions: (1) Should PKK disarm itself and end
the armed struggle? (2) Should PKK form a political party and participate in politics?
Source: The authors created this table using statistics from two original public opinion surveys conducted
in 2011 and 2015.
*
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the PKK. The popular support, that is to say, those who do not view the PKK
as a terrorist organization and at the same time view it as an organization
that represents Kurds, has increased from 27 percent in 2011 to 45 percent in
2015. Ergil (2010) had found that the percentage of those who do not view the
PKK as a terrorist organization was 29 percent in DTP dominant cities and 16
percent in other cities in the region.55 However, the high percentage of “I do
not know,” 24 percent in the first group of cities and 16 percent in the second
group suggest that the actual support may be higher.56
Figure 2.1 displays the results of the BDP in 2011 and HDP in 2015. The
percentage of people who believed that Kurdish parties represent Kurds
increased from 55 to 64. Those who answered negatively to this question
declined from 22 to 15 percent in 2015. Taking into account those who view
the PKK only partially favorably, the results suggest that both before but
more significantly after the peace talks, the Kurdish political movement had
reached a high degree of support, more than 64 percent.
Figure 2.2 suggests that the linguistic and cultural demands of Kurds
from the state is at a level higher than the Turkish state imagines or is willing to grant. Even before the peace talks, Kurds wanted Friday sermons in
Kurdish (70%), education in in their mother tongue (65%), optional Kurdish
courses (80%), Kurdish names for villages (80%), towns, and other localities
(74%), as well as wanting to be served in Kurdish in state institutions such as
municipalities, courts, and hospitals (82%). The support for these linguistic

Figure 2.1 Do Kurdish Parties Represent Kurds? (%) Note: The translations of the questions are as follows: Do you think that the successor party of HADEP and DEHAP, the
BDP is a party that represents Kurds? (2011); and do you think that the successor party of
HADEP, DEHAP and BDP, the HDP, having seats in Parliament, is a party that represent
Kurds? (2015). Source: The authors created this figure using statistics from two original
public opinion surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015.
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Figure 2.2 Support for Linguistic/Cultural Rights (%) Note: The translations of the
questions are as follows: Do you think that municipalities, hospitals, and courts provide
services in Kurdish? Kurdish names for locations such as villages, towns, and cities would
be allowed; education in mother tongue in primary/secondary and high schools should
be allowed if there is a demand? Do you think that optional courses in Kurdish should
be offered like English and German? Friday sermon in Kurdish should be provided in the
Kurdish-dominant places? Source: The authors created this figure using statistics from two
original public opinion surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015.

rights has reached 87 percent and more, except for education in their mother
language (83%). Ergil (2010) asks a similar question, whether one supports
education in Kurdish.57 Fifty-nine percent of Kurds in DTP-dominant cities
and towns said yes, but this percentage went down to 16 percent in regional
cities where DTP was not the dominant party. However, the high percentage
of “I do not knows” in the first (14%) and especially in the second category
(38%) does not allow us to make a meaningful comparison, but due to the
reasons discussed in footnote 6, the results suggest that support for cultural
rights have been high among Kurds.
Do these results translate into supporting political autonomy or even secession? Figure 2.3 suggests that more than half of Kurds would like to entertain
their linguistic and cultural rights with political autonomy as citizens of the
Turkish state. The peace talks increased their demand for regional parliaments (49 to 64%), a regional flag (40 to 58%), and Kurdish as an official
language (56 to 74%) as the survey year moves from 2011 to 2015. Having
said that, the support for an independent Kurdish state increased significantly,
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Figure 2.3 Support for Political Rights: Autonomy, Independence and others (%) Note:
The translations of the questions are as follows: Do you think that Kurds should secede
from Turkey and form an independent state? Do you think the Kurdish language, in addition to Turkish, should be recognized as an official language? Do you think that there
should be a regional flag in the Kurdish-dominant places? Should there be a regional
parliament in the Kurdish-dominant places? Do you think that Kurds should have autonomy in Turkey? The respondents answered this question, Yes or No. Source: The authors
created this figure using statistics from two original public opinion surveys conducted in
2011 and 2015.

but remained at less than half of the population, rising from 24 percent in
2011 to 38 percent in 2015.
CONCLUSION
We discussed the changing policies and positions of political parties and
Kurdish political actors over time and claimed that the lengthy civil war has
created a convergence of demands between secular and religious Kurds, in
particular linguistic and cultural rights. The findings on the public opinion
survey conducted in 2015 suggest that more than 80 percent of the Kurdish
public has demanded the right to study their language, receive an education
in their mother language, get served in public institutions in Kurdish, and
want to listen to Friday sermons in Kurdish. These figures imply, without the
fulfillment of them that neither the Kurdish conflict nor the political instability fed by it will end.58
Furthermore, the Kurdish public opinion wants “an official recognition” without a stick. Despite some reforms, the Turkish state under the
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conservative AKP governments still refuses official recognition of Kurds
and the Kurdish language. The “too little too late” policy of the Turkish state
toward the Kurdish conflict created not only distrust between Kurds and
the Turkish state, but also fostered cultural nationalism, a prerequisite for
political demands.59 Now, Kurds want their language to be an official state
language and they aspire to have their regional government, parliament, and
flag within the existing borders. While the majority agrees upon autonomy
of these regional institutions, only a little more than one-third of the Kurds
seek secession. However, the maltreatment of the Kurds and the continuation
of the rejection of linguistic and cultural rights may help the upward trend in
demanding an independent state, fostering inter-ethnic communal violence
and social unrest.60 In this sense, the findings confirm that the securitization
of the Kurdish conflict has transformed Kurds with a private ethnic identity
or non-politicized disposition into politicized ones; this is especially true of
Kurdish youths who associate the Turkish state with the military and police,
and their hostile attitudes and behaviors toward them.61
Turning to Kurdish actors, the higher support for legal politics through the
Democratic Regions Party (DBP) and HDP, rather than support for the PKK,
suggests that the Kurdish public opinion lends its support for these parties.
Kurds have already endured decades of “Emergency Rule” (OHAL), curfew,
extrajudicial killings, and human rights abuses amidst economic and social
difficulties. High support for legal Kurdish parties suggests that seeking an
“ordinary life” and “ordinary politics” is among their primary preferences.
The urban warfare in the post-2015 era and the displacement of hundreds
of thousands of people as a result may exert an effect on attitudes toward
Kurdish parties and the PKK that should be examined in future studies. One
can assume that while the PKK lost some support among Kurds, this does
not mean that it was replaced by support for the AKP or the state actors,
especially as long as Kurds do not see any improvement in their political
rights and economic situation. Now, the AKP has been transformed from
anti-establishment party to the statist party in the eyes of the Kurdish public
as a result of increasing terror discourse toward the Kurdish conflict by the
AKP government in alliance with the ultranationalist MHP). This perception has been consolidated by the replacement of elected mayors by the
state-appointed ones (kayyum/kayyım) between 2016 and the 2019 March
local elections and the ongoing imprisonment of Kurdish MPs, including
the party cochairs, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ. There is
increasing evidence that there is high support for the securitization of Kurdish rights among the Turkish state apparatus and the Turkish public. This
trend, merged with the state’s concerns due to the Kurdish enclave in Syria
and unforeseen events in the region, is likely to prolong the political status
quo and civil war at the cost of significant loss of life, as well as civil and
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political liberties.62 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how long this unofficial recognition with a stick policy toward Kurds will continue without
a reformed political system that is responsive to the cultural and political
demands of Kurds.
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